Generalizing is necessary or even unavoidable by Otte, Michael F. et al.
 Otte, M. F., Mendonça, T. M., Gonzaga, L., & de Barros, L. (2015). Generalizing is neces-
sary or even unavoidable. PNA, 9(3), 143-164. 
GENERALIZING IS NECESSARY OR EVEN 
UNAVOIDABLE 
Michael F. Otte, Tânia M. Mendonça, and Luiz de Barros 
The problems of geometry and mechanics have driven forward the generali-
zation of the concepts of number and function. This shows how application 
and generalization together prevent that mathematics becomes a mere for-
malism. Thoughts are signs and signs have meaning within a certain context. 
Meaning is a function of a term: This function produces a pattern. Algebra or 
modern axiomatic come to mind, as examples. However, strictly formalistic 
mathematics did not pay sufficient attention to the fact that modern axiomatic 
theories require a complementary element, in terms of intended applications 
or models, not to end up in a merely formal game. 
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La generalización es necesaria o incluso inevitable 
Los problemas de geometría y mecánica han motivado la generalización de 
los conceptos de número y función. Esto muestra cómo la aplicación y la ge-
neralización previenen que las matemáticas sean un mero formalismo. Los 
pensamientos son signos y los signos tienen un significado dentro de un cierto 
contexto. El significado es una función de un término: esta función produce 
un patrón. El álgebra o la moderna axiomática vienen a la mente como ejem-
plos. Sin embargo, las matemáticas estrictamente formales no prestaron sufi-
ciente atención al hecho de que las teorías axiomáticas modernas requieren 
un elemento complementario, en términos de aplicaciones intencionadas o 
modelos, para no terminar en un juego meramente formal. 
Términos clave: Cognición matemática; Complementariedad; Epistemología genética 
“The most notorious ill-fortune must, in the end, yield to the untiring courage of phi-
losophy—as the most stubborn city to the ceaseless vigilance of an enemy.”  
Edgar Allan Poe 
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GENERALIZATION AND HUMAN SUBJECTIVITY 
We must generalize, if we want to secure the future of mathematical and scientific 
culture. Without generalization mathematics would become a kind of chess, as math-
ematicians since Peirce (1839-1914) and Poincaré (1854-1912), had repeatedly 
stressed. A characteristic of mathematical thought is, says Peirce “that it can have no 
success where it cannot generalize”. And in a similar vein Poincaré states that “there 
is no science but the science of the general”.  
Now the chess game, in particular, has nowadays become the domain of the com-
puter, of the machine. Nobody knows this better than the current world chess champi-
on Magnus Carlsen. His most important teacher and coach in lonely Norway had been 
the computer. Characterized by its electronic training partner, Carlsen plays such an 
unorthodox style that many grandmasters, arrested in the tradition, has to capitulate 
unexpectedly. Because, as Carlsen says, no man can win against the computer today, 
the game of chess has become psychological warfare. And no one understands it bet-
ter to wear down his opponents through a tough delaying strategy than Magnus Carl-
sen. As soon as the complexity of a situation grows beyond sensible efforts, it is more 
profitable to concentrate on the psychology of your opponent. As his biographer 
Somen Agdestein says: “While Kasparov was concerned about deep ideas, Magnus is 
only interested in what works to beat that particular opponent at that particular day” 
(Agdestein, 2013, preface). Similarly, in the formal teaching situation the student will 
focus on what the teacher wants to hear from him and will not bother with ideas or 
universal insights. 
School mathematics is essentially algebra. Algebra in turn is a language or tech-
nology that works without thinking, as Leibniz was the first to realize. In addition, he 
thought that the algebraic calculus assumes meaning from a pre-established harmony 
between the order of signs and the order of things. Nowadays, in face of a highly var-
ied and dynamical world, the notion of pre-established harmony makes no sense any-
more and meaningfulness depends on generalization and new applications. The broad-
er view on our lives provides meaning. 
Because knowledge is a process of mutual adaptation of subject and object, a pro-
cess, which changes both parts involved, we find the very same complementarities in 
the determination of the subject and object of knowledge. As Rorty says critically and 
with a derogatory undertone, “The distinction of the mental and the physical is para-
sitic on the universal-particular distinction, rather than conversely” (1979, p. 31). That 
is our interest in the universal contributes to our being human subjects. 
So we must create new concepts and ideas, or ideal objects. To generalize means 
just this, introduce new ideal objects. What is in question here is not just to frame new 
formal definitions and some syntactical changes, but to overcome some objective con-
straints. The belief that generalization can be studied merely syntactically leads to 
paradox (Goodman, 1965). And to the complementarity of ideal and existent objects, 
or of meanings and things, corresponds a complementarity between mind and brain, or 
between an epistemological and an ontological subject (Klein, 2014).  
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Our empirical contacts with reality seem limited to the observation of so-called 
facts, that is, are limited to what we can observe locally. Philosophy and science are 
concerned, in contrast, with laws of nature and as these laws establish relations be-
tween universals, rather than particular existents, we have here a case of generaliza-
tion as defined. Now, to generalize and extend factual knowledge requires an act of 
faith in the continuity of nature (Lovejoy, 1964). The so-called principle of continuity 
has been of fundamental importance to all the exact sciences, including mathematics. 
It works, because objective reality itself is not without logic, particularly in the field 
of mechanics and geometry. This is present to everybody, who operates with his/her 
hands and his/her body. Therefore mechanics and geometry, the first positive sciences 
are so confidently based on the principle of continuity. And at a certain level the hu-
man mind or consciousness is nothing but a reflection of this logic.  
At the same time the mind is the most active, unpredictable and unstable thing 
under heaven, that you can think of, hence Plato’s “invention of reason” (Chatelet, 
1992). We humans are besieged and harassed by hopes, dreams, expectations and ide-
as. The influence, which these things have on the mind of man cannot be overestimat-
ed. We live more in a world of signs and possibilities, than in a universe of determi-
nate things. This means that the knowledge process is to be described as the semiotic 
process of interpretation and is, therefore, a kind of interactive process between ob-
jects and ideas. This is what we mean by the notion of “complementarity” (Otte, 
2003a). 
ALL GENERAL PHENOMENA ARE ESSENTIALLY OF THE 
CHARACTER OF SIGNS 
A reality and its description are of different logical types: The menu is not the meal. A 
representation cannot be reduced to the object represented, a concept cannot be re-
duced to its extension, a set cannot be reduced to its elements, as Russell’s paradoxes 
of set theory have shown clearly. All general phenomena are essentially of the charac-
ter of signs. From an absolute and static point of view, symbol and object are even in-
comparably different. Only from a genetic point of view, we may bridge this abyss 
between the definite and the only vaguely described and incompletely determined. 
Meaningfulness is, after all, based on selective loss of detail and on generalization. 
To generalize, we have said, means to introduce new ideal objects. But, what are 
ideal objects? And, how can we humans have grasp of, or insight into, the realm of 
ideas or abstract objects? Platonists, like the inhabitants of “Cantor’s paradise” would 
answer to the first question by conceiving of ideal objects as extensions of concepts. 
On this account the number symbols, 1, 2, 3, are proper names of certain ideal objects, 
of “multitudes composed of monads, of unities” as Euclid says. And it is form, which 
adds coherence to a multitude, makes unity out of it (Klein, 1985, p. 48).  
There is a very different view of universals and ideal objects, however, derived 
from Aristotle’ metaphysics, rather than from Plato’s theory of forms. It is generality 
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as continuity. It means that a general is something not specified in every respect, like 
when we speak about a man, or an apple in general. The idea of a general, says Peirce, 
“involves the idea of possible variations” (Peirce, 1931-1935, p. 102). This difference 
in the notion of universals reflects a certain opposition between the so-called “context 
of discovery” and the “context of justification”. We justify mathematical statements 
by formal proofs and these are based on a conception of mathematics established by 
relations of identity and difference, rather than of continuity. 
Peirce describes the concentration on the process of generalization as follows. 
What I propose to do tonight is, following the lead of those mathematicians 
who question whether the sum of the three angles of a triangle is exactly 
equal to two right angles, to call in question the perfect accuracy of the fun-
damental axiom of logic. This axiom is that real things exist, or in other 
words, what comes to the same thing, that every intelligible question whatever 
is susceptible in its own nature of receiving a definite and satisfactory an-
swer, if it be sufficiently investigated by observation and reasoning... Let me 
be quite understood. As far as all ordinary and practical questions go I insist 
on this axiom as much as ever. (Peirce, 1857-1886, pp. 545-546) 
If an intelligible question whatever is not susceptible in its own nature of receiving a 
definite and satisfactory answer, we must generalize, to find that answer. And the an-
swer we find consists of some general relationships between universals, for example, 
between the angle sum of a general triangle and the possible relations between two 
straight lines. In addition, it is obvious from Peirce’s statement that theories become 
realities sui generis. Thus, a theory consists of a specific form and a set of intended 
applications or problems. Universals are, according to this view, conceived of as free 
objectual variables.  
Such variables appear in propositions like: An apple is a fruit, or: Man is good 
and bad, or: an equilateral triangle is a general triangle, or, if a and b are natural num-
bers, then . “In a proposition like ‘an apple is a fruit’ it would be unnatural 
to interpret ‘an apple’ as a placeholder, because this presupposes that we have given 
individual names to all the apples in this world” (Quine, 1990, p. 99). When we affirm 
that a falling stone has a definite acceleration, we do not refer to a particular stone that 
fell to the ground five minutes ago. 
There are ideas of an apple or a stone or a triangle in general, but they turn out to 
be ideas of particular triangles, put to a certain use. On such an account, a general tri-
angle is a free variable, and is to be treated as representative of a kind and not as a col-
lection of determinate triangles. The variability is determined by theory, or more spe-
cifically, by an axiomatic description of it. For example, the sentence “an equilateral 
triangle is a general triangle” is true in the context of affine geometry, but is false in 
Euclidean geometry. So if the task, for instance, is to prove the theorem that the medi-
ans of a triangle intersect in one point, the triangle on which the proof is to be based 
can be assumed equilateral. The triangle plays a merely instrumental or functional role 
in the proof. What the proof is really about, is the determination of the center of gravi-
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ty of three equal masses. And in the usual proofs of the angle sum of a Euclidean tri-
angle, again the triangle is only functional to establishing the relationship between 
parallelism and the angle sum. 
And, when Joule set up his little machinery, he was interested in the law-like rela-
tionship between heat and motion, conceiving of them as equivalent representations of 
the universal idea of energy. This idea, in turn, is functional to establishing the rela-
tionship between the phenomena. Ideal objects, like energy, or the famous general tri-
angle are continua that can variously and differently be specified if need be. 
Euclid, Apollonius or Pappus worked on geometrical configurations, understood 
as free variables, which led Fermat to find fault in their procedure, because they did 
not present matters “generally enough” (Klein, 1985, p. 13). Fermat obviously had a 
different view of generality, in terms of quantification, then the Greek scholars.  
Under one interpretation the statement (to be proved, my insertion) refers to a 
definite totality.... and it says something about each one of them. Under the 
other interpretation no such totality is supposed and the sentence has much 
more conditional character. (Mueller, 1969, p. 290) 
Diagrammatic reasoning, as employed by Apollonius or Euclid could thus better be 
described in terms of the notion of “thought experiment”, that is, “involving an ideal-
ized physical object, which can be represented in a diagram” (Mueller, 1969, p. 291). 
RELATIONAL THINKING 
Number, or more generally arithmetic, was to the Pythagoreans “mainly a science of 
the visible universe, a cosmology, i.e. a science of the unity and order of this uni-
verse” (Klein, 1985, p. 45), to Dedekind it was a means to better distinguish between 
things. Dedekind was—besides Grassmann and Peano—among the first mathemati-
cians, who answered the question, what numbers are, not by an analysis of their onto-
logical status as single entities, but as elements of a structure, or series, such that ask-
ing for properties of numbers, which do not stem from the relations they bear to one 
another, becomes pointless. This opened the door to an axiomatic presentation of 
arithmetic, about 2000 years after Euclid’s axiomatization of geometry.  
Hilbert says that the free variables occurring in axiomatic statements are of this 
kind of “Aristotelian” generality. 
For example, the statement that if A is a numerical symbol, then  
is universally true, is from our finitary perspective incapable of negation. We 
will see this better if we consider that this statement cannot be interpreted as 
a conjunction of infinitely many numerical equations by means of “and” but 
only as a hypothetical judgment which asserts something for the case when a 
numerical symbol is given. (Hilbert, 1964, p. 91, our translation) 
In addition, Hilbert himself gave, speaking about mathematical generalizations, the 
following examples of ideal elements. 
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The method of ideal elements is used even in elementary plane geometry. The 
points and straight lines of the plane originally are real, actually existent ob-
jects. One of the axioms that hold for them is the axiom of connection: one 
and only one straight line passes through two points. It follows from this axi-
om that two straight lines intersect at most at one point. There is no theorem 
that two straight lines always intersect at some point, however, for the two 
straight lines might well be parallel. Still we know that by introducing ideal 
elements, viz., infinitely long lines and points at infinity, we can make the the-
orem that two straight lines always intersect at one and only one point come 
out universally true. These ideal "infinite" elements have the advantage of 
making the system of connection laws as simple and perspicuous as possible. 
Moreover, because of the symmetry between a point and a straight line, there 
results the very fruitful principle of duality for geometry. 
Another example of the use of ideal elements are the familiar complex-
imaginary magnitudes of algebra which serve to simplify theorems about the 
existence and number of the roots of an equation. Just as infinitely many 
straight lines, viz., those parallel to each other, are used to define an ideal 
point in geometry, so certain systems of infinitely many numbers are used to 
define an ideal number. This application of the principle of ideal elements is 
the most ingenious of all. If we apply this principle systematically throughout 
an algebra, we obtain exactly the same simple and familiar laws of division 
which hold for the familiar whole numbers 1, 2, 3, 4… We are already in the 
domain of higher arithmetic. (Hilbert, 1964, p. 85) 
WHAT IS A THEORY? 
The twofold character of the general is not least expressed in the history of mathemat-
ics by two different interpretations of the continuity principle, two interpretations, 
over which Cauchy and Poncelet quarreled (Belhoste, 1991, p. 55). Rather than con-
ceiving of this principle in terms of structure and variation or invariance, Cauchy 
thought of continuity in terms of approximation and limit, as part of a kind of induc-
tive or bottom-up strategy, that is, by a transition from the potential infinite to the ac-
tual infinite. The program of rigorization by arithmetization searched to solve the 
foundational problems in a reductionistic manner, by defining the continuum as a set.  
The axiomatic movement, in contrast, as anticipated in the works of Poncelet or 
Grassmann, tried to employ, so to say, a top-down strategy, solving the foundational 
problems of mathematics by extending and generalizing its relational structures and its 
rules of inference. Grassmann’s dropping of the commutativity of a general product 
and his definition of the anti-commutative vector product provides a pertinent exam-
ple here. Grassmann was well aware of the fact that this loosening of formal con-
straints could count as genuine generalization only, as soon as there corresponded a 
Generalizing is Necessary or Even Unavoidable 
PNA 9(3) 
149 
semantic field a possible application to the new structure and he found this application 
in electrodynamics (Otte, 2003b, p. 189). 
Now the rigor movement of arithmetization could succeed only, if it generalized 
the number concept itself. Ideas like motion, law of nature etc. have been represented 
by mathematicians in terms of the idea of a mathematical function. In classical math-
ematics from Leibniz to Euler, a mathematical function had been framed, either ana-
lytically in terms of formula or rule, or as a continuous geometrical curve. When by 
the end of the 18th century the importance of the relationship between the notions of 
function and of continuity, became more clearly perceived and the basic property of 
an abstract mathematical function became realized in terms of its continuity, the func-
tion concept had to be generalized. As Bochner (1974) observes, “the conceptions of 
function and of continuity have evolved simultaneously” (p. 845).  
Since Bolzano or Cauchy mathematicians considered curves as point sets, rather 
than conceiving of them in analytical terms as formulas, because the number of con-
ceivable functions was much larger this way and the range of possible applications of 
the function concept increased considerably. But now the number concept had to be 
generalized and enlarged accordingly, by creating the real and complex numbers to 
successfully arithmetize the continuum, and makes the approach work. This proved 
not to be possible in a constructive way, however, but had to be done axiomatically.  
Nevertheless, the movement of arithmetization criticized and deplored the fact, 
that the axiomatic characterization of numbers ignores the question of existence and 
leads to a situation where every number-symbol becomes infinitely ambiguous. Nei-
ther Peano nor Hilbert are capable of defining what the number one is, says Russell. 
Modern axiomatic theories became, on the one hand, intensional theories, in the sense 
that the axioms as a set of postulates not only determine the intensions of the theoreti-
cal terms, but also descriptively constitute the extensions or referents. In Euclidean 
geometry, for example, the objects about which the theory speaks seem to be given by 
intuition, and independently of the theory. In Hilbert’s geometry or Peano’s arithme-
tic, the situation is quite different. So, strictly formalistic mathematics did not pay suf-
ficient attention to the fact that modern axiomatic theories require a complementary 
element in terms of intended applications or models, not to fall prey to the semantic 
paradoxes. Russell had to introduce his “vicious circle principle” to avoid the para-
doxes in the conceptual system.  
This principle seems necessary for nominalism or constructivism only 
because the construction of a thing can certainly not be based on a totality of 
things to which the thing to be constructed itself belongs. If however it is a 
question of objects that exist independently of our constructions there is noth-
ing in the least absurd in the existence of totalities which can be described 
only by reference to this totality. (Gödel, 1944, p. 136) 
Hence results Gödel’s intuitive Platonism. And Gödel believes that we have direct, 
intuitive access to new ideas and are able to frame them into new axioms. The reason 
for the indispensability of intuition is simply that we cannot reach the objective world 
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by means of language and cannot finitely describe the meaning of any idea, concept or 
symbol. Gödel says what follows.  
Obviously… the certainty of mathematics is to be secured not by proving cer-
tain properties by a projection onto material systems namely, the manipula-
tion of physical symbols, but rather by cultivating (deepening) knowledge of 
the abstract concepts themselves… The procedure must thus consist, at least 
to a large extent, in a clarification of meaning that does not consist in giving 
definitions. Now in fact, there exists today the beginning of a science which 
claims to possess a systematic method for such a clarification of meaning, 
and that is the phenomenology founded by Husserl… Namely, it turns out that 
in the systematic establishment of the axioms of mathematics, new axioms, 
which do not follow by formal logic from those previously established, again 
and again become evident…  
I would like to point out that this intuitive grasping of ever newer axioms that 
are logically independent from the earlier ones, which is necessary for the 
solvability of all problems even within a very limited domain, agrees in prin-
ciple with the Kantian conception of mathematics… I believe it to be a gen-
eral feature of many of Kant's assertions that literally understood they are 
false, but in a broader sense contain deep truths. In particular, the whole 
phenomenological method… goes back in its central idea to Kant.  
(Gödel, 2001, p. 61) 
On the other hand, all that we perceive and can think about, appears before our mind’s 
eyes framed by symbols and other types of representations. Hence the importance of 
diagrams analytical languages and the axiomatic method. In summary, we see that the 
duality of the conceptual or analytical approach and the perception of the related se-
mantic fields or intended applications can be fruitfully related to each other only from 
an evolutionary or genetic point of view.  
PHENOMENOLOGY AND MATHEMATICS 
Phenomenology is the science of pure possibility and so, according to Gödel, it must 
precede the science of real fact. Another way to characterize phenomenology consists 
in pointing out that it is studying that, which is common to all phenomena, while natu-
ral science is concerned with natural phenomena, and sociology looks into the nature 
of social phenomena, etc. Phenomenology, says Peirce (1931-1935), “studies the 
kinds of elements universally present… to the mind” (p. 186). From this point of 
view, Peirce concludes that three categories, which he calls, in an abstract manner 
first, second and third, belong to all phenomena, because they are the ingredients of 
any sign and everything, which is present to the minds must be of the nature of a rep-
resentation. Now, a sign, according to Peirce 
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is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or ca-
pacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person an 
equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. That sign which it creates 
I call the interpretant of the first sign. The sign stands for something, its ob-
ject. It stands for that object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of 
idea. "Idea" is here to be understood in a sort of Platonic sense (Peirce, 1931-
1935, Vol. 2, p. 228). 
To Peirce, phenomenology is the science of appearances and it is abstract in the sense 
that its subject matter is general and hypothetical, just as the constructs of mathemat-
ics are. However, as mathematics is, according to Peirce “the science which draws 
necessary conclusions”, it appears as an essential instrument to phenomenological 
analysis and plays a functional role in its considerations. And a phenomenology which 
does not reckon with “pure mathematics… will be the same pitiful clubfooted affair 
which Hegel produced” (Peirce, 1931-1935, Vol. 5, p. 40). 
What is wrong with Hegel’s phenomenology? Phenomenology has to start from 
what is necessarily to be recognized or taken into account in any effort to generalize. 
Phenomenology therefore is part of any theory of development and evolution. Hegel’s 
view of development knows only of continuity, however, and excludes pure chance 
and brutish, unresolved fact. It is essentially a theory of conceptual development. 
Some Hegelian philosophers seem, Peirce writes what follows.    
To think that the real subject of a proposition can be denoted by a general 
term of the proposition; that is, that precisely what it is that you are talking 
about can be distinguished from other things by giving a general description 
of it. Kant already showed, in a celebrated passage of his cataclysmic work, 
that this is not so (see Kant, 1787, B 626, our insertion); and recent studies in 
formal logic have put it in a clearer light. We now find that, besides general 
terms, two other kinds of signs are perfectly indispensable in all reasoning. 
(Peirce, 1931-1935, Vol. 8, p. 41) 
One of these kinds is the index, the other the icon. It is in the dynamics of mathemati-
cal reasoning only, where they interact and come together. Peirce calls icons and indi-
ces explicitly non-symbolic thought-signs (Peirce, 1931-1935, Vol. 6, p. 338), and dis-
tinguishes them by saying that icons are pictures or diagrams or other images such as 
have to be used to explain the meanings of words, whereas indices have the role of 
designating the subject of discourse. One might think, Peirce himself adds 
that there would be no use for indices in pure mathematics, dealing, as it 
does, with ideal creations, without regard to whether they are anywhere real-
ized or not. But the imaginary constructions of the mathematician, and even 
dreams, are so far approximate to reality as to have a certain degree of fixity, 
in consequence of which they can be recognized and identified as individuals. 
(Peirce, 1931-1935, Vol. 2, p. 305) 
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The indices occurring in pure mathematics refer to entities or objects that belong to a 
model, rather than to “the real world”, that is, they indicate objects in constructed se-
mantic universes. That mathematics, on the one hand, does not make existential 
claims, only outlining possibilities and in the other hand makes essential use of indi-
ces, in order to represent statements of fact, is fundamental for Peirce’s conception of 
mathematics as “diagrammatic reasoning”.  
Mathematics proceeds by hypothetic-deductive reasoning, and “hypothesis substi-
tutes, for a complicated tangle of predicates attached to one subject, a single concep-
tion” (Peirce, 1857-1886, Vol. 3, p. 337), that is, introduces an ideal object. Peirce 
calls the process of generalization “abduction” and he stresses the importance of what 
he called theorematic reasoning, in contrast to corollarial reasoning, which relies only 
on that which is enunciated in the premises. If a proof is possible only by reference to 
other things not mentioned in the original statement and to be introduced by intuition 
and abductive reasoning, if we need, for example, auxiliary constructions, which were 
not mentioned in the premises of the theorem, in order to be able to carry out a geo-
metrical argument, such a proof is theorematic. The mathematician constructs and 
manipulates or modifies a diagrammatic representation of the premises in order to find 
out that foreign idea—to use Peirce's expression—which must be added to the set of 
explicit premises already available. Theorematic reasoning implies generalization, that 
is, the introduction of new ideal objects. By the abductive inference, says Peirce, “a 
number of reactions called for by one occasion get united in a general idea which is 
called out by the same occasion” (Peirce, 1892, p. 552). 
The abductive suggestion comes to us like a flash. It is an act of insight, alt-
hough of extremely fallible insight. It is true that the different elements of the 
hypothesis were in our minds before; but it is the idea of putting together 
what we had never before dreamed of putting together, which flashes the new 
suggestion before our contemplation. (Peirce, 1931-1935, Vol. 5, p. 181) 
IS MATHEMATICS CAPABLE OF COPING WITH CHANGE? 
The classic thinking of ancient Greece was marked by aporetic situations and para-
doxes. Zeno’s paradox of the race of Achilles and the tortoise represents a defining 
expression. Originally intended as a defense of Parmenides, this paradox characterizes 
the epistemology of Plato too.  
The world is, and has ever been, violent, messy and in permanent change. In con-
trast: Humans are searching for clarity, stability, orientation and self-identity. Plato-
nism was a first reaction to these contrasting situations. Platonism teaches that diversi-
ty, change and motion are not real, are only appearances. This static view causes 
problems of knowledge and explanation. The Theaetetus is one of Plato’s dialogues 
concerning the nature of knowledge. Therein Plato claims that to explain is to analyze 
complexes into their elements, i.e., those parts which cannot be further analyzed. The 
primary elements are “unaccountable and unknowable, but perceivable” while the 
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complexes are “knowable and expressible” and so can be objects of “true judgment” 
(202b).  
However, Socrates exposes some difficulties by examining letters. He takes the 
first two letters of his name, S and O to wonder if the syllable “So” is knowable, while 
the individual letters are not (203b-d). Theaetetus finds the idea strange, so Socrates 
deduces that in order to know the syllable, the letters must be known first (203e). 
They cannot be known, however, because they are not reducible to more simple ele-
ments. They can only, as it seems, be explained by themselves. P means just P! They 
can only be given as forms! 
So Socrates returns to talking about elements and complexes to propose that they 
are in the same class (205d). “The number of the army is the same as the army.” 
(204d) However, when we make a drawing of a swan, for example, in the end we 
must not just draw feathers, legs, wings, and head, but must draw the swan! The 
whole discussion ends in disaster when Socrates finally says 
but how utterly foolish, when we are asking what is knowledge, that the reply 
should only be, right opinion with knowledge of difference or of anything! 
And so, Theaetetus, knowledge is neither sensation, nor true opinion, nor yet 
definition and explanation, accompanying and added to true opinion. (Socra-
tes, 210b) 
As any representation is nothing but a particular perspective or a certain point of view 
on something and thus is relative, these ideas or forms, that is, the objects of true 
knowledge, must be directly known. To know means to intuitively grasp the essence 
or idea of something and to intuit it as a form. So Plato’s problem, stated in semiotic 
terms, consists in the inevitable difference between sign and object, between 
knowledge and the object known, between form and meaning, or between the ideas 
and their shadows in the everyday world, a world that can only imperfectly approxi-
mate an unchanging and ultimate reality. The difference between the sign and the 
thing represented by it, thus causes some paradoxes of knowledge and explanation 
that have to be approached from a genetic and evolutionary perspective. The essence 
of something becomes distributed to all possible representations, past present and fu-
ture. This totality obviously cannot be conceived of as a well-defined set, but estab-
lishes a kind of continuity. 
In contrast to these situations, it had been affirmed many times in history that 
mathematics is essentially a science of the identical and the different, or about equali-
ty and difference. Thus, it is essentially about number. Therefore mathematics should 
be arithmetized. All mathematics, says Russell, for example, “including analytical ge-
ometry, may be considered as consisting wholly of propositions about natural num-
bers” (Russell, 1967, p. 4). Moreover, if the world should be mathematized, it must be 
finished, static and discrete. Oswald Spengler, in his The Decline of the West (1918), 
expressed these desires. 
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In number, as the sign of the completed and limited, is contained the nature of 
all reality, that has become recognized and limited at the same time, as Py-
thagoras, or who it was otherwise, realized with innermost certainty as a re-
sult of a great, quite religious intuition. (p. 110) 
One of the most important discoveries of the Pythagorean School is without doubt that 
of the incommensurability between the side and the diagonal of the square. And this 
implied the failure of arithmetization and was a rejection of the Pythagorean view that 
the realm of number provides a model of the entire natural world. Hence the im-
portance of the continuum, and the continuity principle.  
Now, the continuum of space is nothing but the realm of change and of possible 
relations, rather than a set of distinct points. Already the solution to Zeno`s paradoxes, 
proposed by Aristotle, involves distinguishing between, what he termed a ‘continu-
ous’ line and a line divided into parts. And he solved the paradox, by saying that “if 
time is continuous, magnitude is continuous also” and putting the continua of space 
and time alongside each other. Aristotle is most often regarded as the great representa-
tive of a logic and a mathematics, which rests on the assumption of the possibility of 
clear divisions and rigorous classification.  
But this is only half the story about Aristotle; and it is questionable whether it 
is the more important half. For it is equally true that he first suggested the 
limitations and dangers of classification, and the non-conformity of nature to 
those sharp divisions which are so indispensable for language [...]. (Lovejoy, 
1964, p. 58) 
Aristotle thereby became responsible for the introduction of the principle of continuity 
into natural history. “And the very terms and illustrations used by a hundred later 
writers down to Locke and Leibniz and beyond, show that they were but repeating Ar-
istotle’s expressions of this idea.” (p. 58) 
It also seems that in Greek mathematics occurred two different kinds of proof. 
During the first phase of Greek mathematics there a proof consisted in showing or 
making visible the truth of a statement. This was the epagogic method. “This first 
phase was followed by an apagogic or deductive phase. During this phase visual evi-
dence was rejected and Greek mathematics became a deductive system” (Koetsier, 
1991, p. 180f). Apagogic proof primarily verifies and epagogic proof generalizes. 
Epagoge is usually translated as induction. But it is perhaps not quite, what we think 
of as induction, but is rather taking one individual as prototypical for the whole kind. 
Aristotle writes with respect to epagoge the following ideas.  
The consideration of similarity is useful both for inductive arguments and for 
hypothetical reasoning [...] It is useful for hypothetical reasoning, because it 
is an accepted opinion that whatever holds good of one or several similars, 
holds good also for the rest. (Aristotle, 108b 7) 
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Epagogic proof depends on some law of the uniformity of nature or some continuity 
principle.  
PLATONIC IDEAS AND HUMAN SUBJECTIVITY 
Plato’s philosophy originated, as we know, in the scandal of Socrates’ conviction and 
death. How could the people of Athens not have perceived that Socrates was a good 
man, how could such a seemingly obvious truth become so distorted? Plato held the 
Sophists responsible, so, he fought against them and against their motto, “Man is the 
measure of all things” (Protagoras). Which man, one might ask. Was Socrates not 
coaxing “the mind down from self-assertion—subjective assertion and private defini-
tion—and lead it back, through the community, home” (Cavell, 2008, p. 43).  
In his dialogue Phaedo, Plato explains that true knowledge is intuitive recollec-
tion, because we have to have a scale and take a prospect to find something beautiful 
or ugly or to find some things equal or different and therefore we must possess some 
non-empirical knowledge (e.g. the form or idea of equality or beauty) at birth, imply-
ing that the soul existed before birth, to carry that knowledge. In other words, there 
are two selves to the person, a mind or soul and a corporal existence, which, by means 
of its senses and activities, establishes relationships between the ideas and the things 
of the world. The belief in universal and objective truths thus encompasses the belief 
in a universal and immortal soul of Man. Eternal ideas correspond to eternal souls.  
Since Rorty, for example, rejects universals, like mathematical objects or natural 
laws, he reduces the human subject to a kind of machine, rather seeing the individual 
in its concrete expression as a reflection of general contexts (be those socio-cultural or 
natural). Society thereby becomes scattered, turning it into a mere set of isolated indi-
viduals, from which then a not explained solidarity is demanded, in order not to turn 
society into hell. How can Rorty try to appeal to “common humanity”, in view of his 
denial of any universal essence or universal idea? On what empathy and human soli-
darity could be based? Rorty himself admits that, “Attempts to unite a striving for per-
fection with a sense of community require us to acknowledge a common human na-
ture” (Rorty, 1989, p. XIII). And further: “Our insistence on contingency, and our 
consequent opposition to ideas like essence, nature and ‘foundation’ makes it impos-
sible for us to retain the notion that some actions and attitudes are naturally ‘inhu-
man’.” (p. 189) 
Peirce’s so called “Pragmatic Maxim” reflects the problem of the complementari-
ty of the collective vs. individual in the constitution of the human subject. The Maxim 
certainly favors scientific operationalism and the interests of the individual subject, 
being directed against Plato’s or Descartes’ intuitionism and their appeals to a priori 
self-evidence. The original 1878 statement of the Maxim runs as follows: “Consider 
what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object 
of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our 
conception of the object.” (Peirce, 1966, p. 124) 
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Peirce comments on this about 25 years later, in 1902, by a contribution to Bald-
win’s Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology. The Pragmatic Maxim, there he says 
that 
might easily be misapplied,... The doctrine appears to assume that the end of 
man is action—If it be admitted, on the contrary, that action wants an end, 
and that end must be something of a general description, then the spirit of the 
maxim itself, which is that we must look to the upshot of our concepts in order 
rightly to apprehend them, would direct us towards something different from 
practical facts, namely, to general ideas, as the true interpreters of our 
thought. (Peirce, 1931-1935, Vol. 5, p. 3) 
Peirce wants by this comment to justify the creation of such entities as the imaginary 
numbers or the “doctrine of incommensurables” which represent a contradiction be-
tween the definite determinations of the everyday world, on the one hand, and the 
world of theory and development, on the other hand, between direct action and gen-
eral intelligibility and reasonableness. To the complementarity of ideas and objects 
corresponds, therefore another one in the constitution of the human subject. Universal 
ideas require universal human spirits and souls. 
Philosophers distinguish between the ontological self and the epistemological self. 
We cannot here completely reproduce the discussion about the two selves (Klein, 
2014), which are complementary to each other, as are ideas and objects. We shall 
however try to provide some hints of the importance of this distinction, discussing 
some examples. The ontological self is a particular existent, while the epistemological 
self is like a general symbol. 
It has been Kant, who had introduced such a distinction into modern philosophy. 
Kant had emphasized the indispensability of a “transcendental subject”, besides the 
empirical subject, because, to know, he argued, means to know that one knows, that 
is, knowledge requires reflective self-consciousness or meta-knowledge. To under-
stand the reality of knowledge one has to understand the reality of understanding. And 
here we meet with the transcendental subject, “which is cognized only by means of 
the thoughts that are its predicates, and of which, apart from these, we cannot form the 
least conception” (Kant, 1787, B 404). The continuity of experience or, as Kant puts 
it, the unity of the “I think”, is an important indication of the objectiveness of 
knowledge. Kant writes: “The ‘I think’ must accompany all my representations, for 
otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought; that rep-
resentation which can be given previously to all thought is called intuition.” (B 131) 
The reflection combines a present question, the actual information or fact with the 
knowledge already stored in memory. This connection cannot simply consist, as Plato 
believes, in a reduction of the new to the old—otherwise there would be nothing 
new—but it must also represent the old in the light of the new and explain it so. The 
new is as much the starting point, as the goal of knowledge. In science, to understand 
a concept means to develop a theory, and vice versa, the theory as a whole is logically 
founded, if it can be understood as an original idea, which has been developed and un-
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folded and has thereby rendered meaningful. The most far-reaching unfolding of the 
idea as a theory itself unfolds the original concept, although it is founded on the latter. 
Hence, these ideas are the goal of theory development. These ideas are, however, at 
the same time its beginning and its base. This means they have to be intuitively im-
pressive and must motivate activity. Fundamental concepts or basic ideas therefore are 
self-referential, that is, they themselves organize the process of their own deployment 
and articulation. The continuity of mind, which Kant wanted to secure by reflection of 
his “I think”, is established in Peirce’s transformation of Kant’s philosophy by the 
endless sign process and therefore, there 
is but one law of mind, namely, that ideas tend to spread continuously and to 
affect certain others which stand to them in a peculiar relation of affectabil-
ity. In this spreading they lose intensity, and especially the power of affecting 
others, but gain generality and become welded with other ideas. We are ac-
customed to speak of ideas as reproduced, as passed from mind to mind, as 
similar or dissimilar to one another, and, in short, as if they were substantial 
things ; nor can any reasonable objection be raised to such expressions. But 
taking the word "idea" in the sense of an event in an individual conscious-
ness, it is clear that an idea once past is gone forever, and any supposed re-
currence of it is another idea. (Peirce, 1892, p. 534) 
Peirce, differently from Kant, considers the continuum of ideas as something objec-
tive, as a continuous interpretation, that is, as a sign process, rather than as an event in 
the subject’s mind. The semiotic theory of Peirce  
Is an attempt to explain the cognitive process of acquiring scientific 
knowledge as a pattern of communicative activity in which the dialogic part-
ners are, indifferently, members of a community or sequential states of a sin-
gle person’s mind. (Parmentier, 1994, p. 3) 
IS THERE MORE TO MATHEMATICS THAN THE CAPACITY TO 
REASON FORMALLY? 
The distinction between calculation and proof is useful in order illustrate the issue in-
sofar as there is a difference between following the course of an argument on the one 
side, and understanding it, on the other.  
Suppose I have found a proof for some mathematical theorem, which after having 
checked out the argument of the proof step by step is now intuitively completely clear 
to me.  
Suppose that a great authority announces that there is something wrong with 
the argument. In that case my experience upon checking over the argument 
may be quite different from what it was before this announcement was made. 
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Just as before, I find that the argument appears to be correct; only this time I 
do not accept it as being correct. (Stolzenberg, 1984, p. 263) 
This remains true even if I cannot find fault with my argument. The distinction be-
tween being correct and merely appearing to be correct is exactly the same as that be-
tween seeing something and merely following a rule or a chain of arguments, or be-
tween arguing logically and formally or having some concrete application in mind.  
As Lewis Carroll had shown in his little piece on Achilles and the Tortoise (Car-
roll, 1895), logic can never force on us the acceptance of anything. And nobody can 
be forced to perceive something he does not want to see. Perceptual judgments, which 
seem the basis of all our knowledge, are of the form: “A perceives B as a case of C”. 
This implies that genuine proofs must—at least in the more complicated cases—
involve generalization and thus employ what Peirce has been called abductive infer-
ences.  
Nevertheless, the difference between an ideal vs. a real state of things, or between 
the mind and the world, seems only relative. This relativity may, however, lead to the 
desire that objective reality should be completely intelligible, even though not every-
thing in the world can have a meaning. For example, the well-known Gestalt psy-
chologist Max Wertheimer (1880-1943) comments on the presentation and solution of 
Zeno's paradoxes by means of a geometric series, resp. the convergence of that series, 
which is accomplished by multiplying the series by a and subtracting that is current in 
present days mathematics. Wertheimer says that 
it is correctly derived, proved, and elegant in its brevity. A way to get real in-
sight into the matter, sensibly to derive the formula is not nearly so easy; it 
involves difficult steps and many more. While compelled to agree to the cor-
rectness of the above proceeding, there are many who feel dissatisfied, 
tricked. The multiplication of  by a together with 
the subtraction of one series from the other, gives the result; it does not give 
understanding of how the continuing series approaches this 'value in its 
growth. Real understanding proceeds by considering what happens in the 
growth of the series and derives the law of this growth, leading to the limit. 
Many do not bother really to understand. They are satisfied to have the result. 
(Wertheimer, 1945, p. 90) 
As an appendix to his book Wertheimer presents an alternative answer. The essential 
characteristic of it consists in his relying on the meaning of some relevant concepts 
(fraction etc.). “If I want to understand”, he says, “I must realize from the beginning 
what the first term 1/a means as a part of its whole.” (p. 218) 
Wertheimer’s solution is foundationalist, insofar as it reduces a problem concern-
ing one concept A (series) to the meaning of another one B (fraction). Whereas a 
complementarist approach would stress the symmetrical aspects of conceivable rela-
tions between A and B. We can for instance, interpreting a periodical decimal fraction 
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(B) as a geometric series (A), directly prove that these decimal fractions represent ra-
tional numbers.  
A representation, like a mathematical formula, may appear to be an impoverish-
ment of the wealth and force of inner experience and intuition. On the other hand, no 
sign can be exhausted by individual experience and intuition. Any symbolization im-
plies, in fact a generalization, as a symbol has meaning, which a thing or a feeling has 
not, and meanings are socially shared and are thus universals, after all (Durkheim, 
1995, p. 433). Meanings or concepts serve the knowledge process and the develop-
ment of discourse. 
Zeno’s paradoxes seem to present another defeat of the Pythagorean dream about 
the mathematical nature of the world. A logic of relations—taking relations as exter-
nal and prior to the relata—is required to deal with these paradoxes. External relations 
lead to structural holism, as in modern axiomatics. Leibniz is considered to have been 
first recognizing the relational character of mathematical cognition, but he considers 
internal relations only, as exemplified by the relation between a father and his child. 
If we accept that Achilles must first reach all the points that the tortoise has al-
ready reached, what we are actually saying is, that Achilles can reach only these 
points, that these are that determine his position. We quasi encapsulate Achilles' 
movement within that of the tortoise; we chain it to the latter. Yet who or what pre-
vents Achilles from running two or three stadiums? We have to symmetrize our per-
spective, by adopting a relational point of view. Precisely speaking, the task is as fol-
lows: Achilles runs ten times as fast as the tortoise, though the tortoise has a one-
stadium start. For each of the stages, x(x > 0) , covered by Achilles, the tortoise has 
crawled the distance f (x) = 110 x +1 stadium. 
The relative movement of Achilles and the tortoise is a linear function, as both 
movements are uniform: f (x) = ax + b  (i.e., when Achilles reaches x, the tortoise is at 
f(x). The problem: At what point does Achilles really catch up with the tortoise? is 
now: What is the fixed point of f(x)? We seemingly have solved the problem by taking 
a relational point of view, that means, by adopting a “world view” which provides ob-
jects and relations between objects with an equal ontological status. This essentially 
makes up for what has been called a transition from thinking in terms concrete objects 
to relational thinking, or thinking in terms of ideal objects.  
The example of Zeno is about constant movement. If we want to treat the more 
general case of accelerated motion we must generalize the mathematical concepts of 
function and number. We have also mentioned this in section What is a theory? So to 
mathematize means to generalize.  
THEORIES ARE REALITIES SUI GENERIS 
One must not only have an idea, but has to find a concrete form of the same, to render 
the idea effective and vice versa. In 1928 Max Dehn (1878-1952), one of Hilbert’s 
M. Otte, T. Mendonça, and L. Gonzaga  
PNA 9(3) 
160 
most prominent students, gave a talk at the University of Frankfurt on the “Mentality 
of the Mathematician”. He said that 
Descartes himself believed that, through an illumination, he had discovered a 
new science…. But this was hardly the case. His great contribution was not 
the discovery of a completely new idea—that of the unity of algebra and ge-
ometry. It is even incorrect to say that he realized the existing idea in a man-
ner more daring than his predecessors…. The historical significance of his 
contribution lies, above all, in formulation…. The origin of ideas is often un-
clear, the roots reaching far back into time cannot be unravelled. But the 
form is always the property of one person, that which is truly individual, 
which happens but once. (Dehn, 1983, p. 18) 
Theories and works of art are constructed forms, they are realities in their own right. 
A work of art is just a work of art; a theory is just a theory. It must be grasped as a 
form sui generis, as a hopefully more intelligible world in itself, rather than as a pale 
and passive reflection of the empirically given world, before we can inquire into its 
possible meanings or applications. In a diagram, like in a theory or a work of art, syn-
thesis of representation is realized in the construction and transformation of the repre-
sentation, that is, in the process of generalization. To generalize in this way one must 
see something and to see means to construct a representation and to show it in a new 
way.  
The comparison with artistic or musical activity is particularly illuminating, be-
cause it shows the importance of the means of representation. In artistic drawing what 
we achieve is a line, and the line does all the work, and if it fails to do so, no philo-
sophical commentary will rescue or repair a bad work of art. In literature or philoso-
phy, it is the word or the sentence, in mathematics the formula or the diagram, which 
carry the entire weight, etc. Mastery, Paul Valéry (1998), says that  
presupposes that ne has the habit of thinking and combining directly from the 
means of imagining a work only within the limits of the means at hand, and 
never approaching a work from a topic or an imagined effect that is not 
linked to the means. (p. 40) 
And the great music director David Barenboim said that 
Music does not work with spiritual means, although it aims at the spiritual 
possibilities of man. Music works with sound. Sound is not spiritual, it is a 
very simple physical means. Sound is related to silence. You have to know as 
a musician, how to start a note, how long to keep it, how is the transition to 
the next note, etc.... I have studied composition with Nadia Boulanger in Par-
is. And she said the sentence: “You have to fill the structure of music with 
emotions and then analyze the emotions” (interview in: Der Spiegel, 12/2014, 
our translation). 
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Therefore, if somebody, like Wertheimer, tries to grasp the meaning of anything, he 
has first of all to appreciate how it is represented. This may be termed “poetic imagi-
nation” and it is as important to the aesthetic world view as it is essential to the logic 
of science and mathematics. The essence of something is the essence of a representa-
tion of that thing and the essence of a representation is nothing but another representa-
tion. Therefore, we might say that the essential meaning or essence or idea is but a 
continuum of possible representations. There is never a literal application of a theory 
nor a direct reference of a painting to reality. Having interpreted a theory or an artistic 
product might change transitorily or permanently our way of seeing the world and of 
our acting within it. Thus texts and theories are means and objects at the same time. 
Means and objects are fully differentiable by their respective moments on individual 
cognitive activity, but they play a completely symmetric part in the development of 
cognition.  
Peirce writes that  
the work of the poet or novelist is not so utterly different from that of the sci-
entific man. The artist introduces a fiction; but it is not an arbitrary one; it 
exhibits affinities to which the mind accords a certain approval in pronounc-
ing them beautiful, which if it is not exactly the same as saying that the syn-
thesis is true, is something of the same general kind. The geometer draws a 
diagram, which if not exactly a fiction, is at least a creation, and by means of 
observation of that diagram he is able to synthesize and show relations be-
tween elements which before seemed to have no necessary connection (Peirce, 
1931-1935, Vol. 1, p. 383). 
One might even claim that the “new” algebra of the 16th/17th centuries has been 
brought about to a large degree by the opportunities offered by the writing system and, 
even more, by the printing press (Eisenstein, 2005). Oral language is an analog sys-
tem; written language speaks to the eye. It allows a meta-perspective and is thus are 
capable of stimulating reflection. And this is an important point.  
Human beings are the only animals to create visual art. At some moment in 
the narrative evolution human societies began to draw and paint things and it 
is safe to say that the act of picture making is only possible because we have 
the faculty to reflective self-consciousness, that is, we are able to represent 
ourselves to ourselves and muse about our own beings by becoming objects in 
our own eyes. This ability is distinct from what has been called pre-reflective 
self-consciousness, that immersion in everyday experience that we do not 
have to reflect upon to perceive… (Hustvedt, 2012, p. 342) 
To be able to reflect on the form of some thought, a new representation and a change 
of perspective is required. The proliferation of texts, made possible by the printing 
press, extended not only the knowledge but the whole knowledge process became 
more objective, dynamic and profound. One could compare identical prints, detect 
contradictions, add supplements, notice and record correlations. Different readers 
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could talk about a precisely quotable argument. Errors could be eliminated and en-
hancements of knowledge became possible. Copernicus and Tycho Brahe are two cen-
trally important examples of the new possibilities and the new style. 
Tycho Brahe did have at his disposal, as few had before him, two separate 
sets of computations based on two different theories, compiled several centu-
ries apart which he could compare with each other. The study of records was 
no less important for Tycho than it had been for the astronomers of the past. 
… His observatory unlike theirs, included a library well stocked with printed 
materials as well as assistants trained in the new art of printing and engrav-
ing. For he took care to install printing presses and a paper mill on the island 
of Hveen. (Eisenstein, 2005, p. 244) 
CONCLUSION 
The opposition between foundationalism and formalism has always dominated the 
epistemological discussions of mathematics, as well as, of mathematics education. 
The controversy about the foundations of mathematics between the movement of 
arithmetization and the axiomatic movement, or Wertheimer’s approach to Zeno’s 
paradoxes of motion, are examples that have been discussed in the paper.  
As the symbol is categorically different from the symbolized, as theory is to be 
distinguished from reality and not one of these two is to be subordinated or to be de-
rived from the other, an evolutionary perspective on knowledge is imperative, because 
otherwise not one of the fundamental questions in the epistemology of mathematics 
can fruitfully be discussed. So the processes of generalization and application of 
mathematics are essential to understand what mathematics is and how it works in the 
context of cultural history or individual cognitive development. 
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